The return of President-elect Donald Trump’s “America first” foreign policy marks the start of a new era in the relationship between the U.S. and Europe, with significant implications for both sides of the trans-Atlantic alliance.
By constitutional design, the U.S. president has considerably more power to steer the nation’s foreign policy than its domestic policy, a quirk not lost on European leaders.
They must now brace for a United States that figures to be more averse to the U.S.-Europe relationship than the last time Trump was commander-in-chief.
Unfortunately, it’s unlikely that Europe has done — or even can do — enough to stand on its own two feet without American crutches.
True, the trans-Atlantic alliance survived Trump’s first term, but it’s a markedly different world now, as an increasingly bellicose Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis continues to undermine global security.
Quite simply, precisely when Europe — and indeed, the free world — needs a strong United States, they are unlikely to find a Trump administration receptive to calls for increased involvement on issues like the war in Ukraine, or NATO cooperation.
Europe and NATO will now need to find a way to fill the void created by a significant withdrawal of American support.
By far, the most important consequence of Trump’s return will be the end of America’s support for Ukraine in its war of self-defense against Russia.
Trump has pledged to end the war, although it is doubtful that his preferred ending envisions giving Ukraine what it needs to fully evict Russian troops.
Instead, Trump is likely to push for an end that leaves Russia in control of roughly one-fifth of Ukraine, rolls back sanctions on Russia, and ultimately leaves Vladimir Putin emboldened.
To be clear, while abandoning Ukraine is a bad policy on its merits, some fault for the war’s current state rests with President Biden.
Biden continually slow-walked aid, giving Ukraine enough to survive but not enough to win. And his overbearing restrictions on how Ukraine could use American arms were akin to forcing the Ukrainians to fight with one hand behind its back.
Trump’s disdain for NATO countries that do not meet the bloc’s spending requirement also figures to be a major point of contention.
Belatedly, some European countries have realized that their days of outsourcing their defense to the U.S. are coming to an end and have ramped up spending.
Twenty-two of the 31 non-U.S. NATO countries now meet or exceed the bloc’s target of spending 2 percent of GDP on the military — double the number meeting the target during Trump’s first term — but major countries like Italy and Spain remain far below that number.
An analysis in the Financial Times underscores how decades of reliance on the United States for protection has taken its toll on Europe’s ability to defend itself should Trump cut American involvement with NATO, or withdraw entirely.
The United States alone has nearly 1,000 more fighter and ground attack aircraft than the rest of NATO combined, and NATO has no replacement for American transportation aircraft.
Moreover, the militaries of Britain, France, and Germany, the three most powerful non-U.S. militaries in the alliance — and NATO’s two European nuclear powers — all suffer from “hollowed-out” manpower and equipment levels.
At the heart of Europe’s dilemma is the lack of political will, including a fragmented defense industry, and an absence of leadership without the U.S., according to European Union diplomats and defense industry executives cited by the Financial Times.
To their credit, European arms manufacturers have finally begun ramping up production of new weapons systems, yet in quality, quantity, and range of capabilities, Europe lags far behind.
Although there is no substitute for the U.S. in preserving global security, a Europe that can pull its own weight on defense matters is undoubtedly a positive, as it would allow the U.S. to focus on other emerging threats such as China.
Withdrawing American forces from Europe would allow for a significant redeployment to the Indo-Pacific, possibly deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and an expansion of North Korea’s nuclear program.
Despite that benefit, it will come at a remarkably high cost to geopolitical stability.
A significant downgrade in America’s relationship with the EU and NATO would undermine the world’s most effective alliance and empower our common enemies.
In Europe, this risks further Russian aggression, potentially even an attack on a NATO country, testing Trump’s commitment to NATO’s Article 5.
Conversely, if Trump allowed Putin to invade a NATO ally, it would expose the hollowness of America’s commitment to its treaty obligations as well as the powerlessness of our European allies.
Put another way, while a stronger Europe, allied with the United States has the potential for tremendous benefits, it is not without serious risks, including undermining America’s geopolitical standing.
Similarly, if Europe feels that the U.S. abandoned them to Russia, it’s doubtful that they would assist us in pushing back against China’s military and economic aggression.
America is strongest when working with our allies, but a “Europe first” movement in response to Trump’s “America first” may leave the U.S. short of allies when we most need them.
This is not to say that Trump should continue giving Europe a free pass. The United States cannot afford to be everywhere at once, and breaking Europe’s complete reliance on American forces is long overdue.
Nor is Trump the first president to question Europe’s commitment — or lack thereof — to defending itself. Former President John F. Kennedy also raised these concerns, but if the world has changed since Trump’s first term, it is wholly unrecognizable from Kennedy’s.
Rather, it is to say that as European countries wake up to a world without a total American security blanket, there is no way to know with any precision whether Trump’s foreign policy will make the world safer or considerably more dangerous.
Douglas E. Schoen is a political consultant and the founder and partner at Schoen Cooperman Research. Saul Mangel is a senior strategist at Schoen Cooperman Research.
