The Middle East is no stranger to upheaval, but the recent surprise rebel offensive in Syria against Bashar al-Assad’s regime has sent shockwaves through the region.
The latest developments, while initially appearing as just one more chapter in Syria’s protracted civil war, could have profound consequences far beyond Damascus. By challenging not only the Assad regime but also the interests of Iran and Russia, the rebels’ gains — they just seized most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city —could reshape the regional balance of power in ways directly affecting the U.S. These shifts, in turn, may create a unique opportunity for Washington to pursue a grand strategy of restraint.
For more than a decade, Syria has been the focal point of an intricate web of alliances and rivalries. Assad, propped up by Iran and Russia, has clung to power through brutal tactics, leveraging his foreign backers’ military and economic support to withstand opposition forces.
However, the latest rebel offensive suggests that this arrangement is no longer as secure as it once seemed. Rebel factions, long fragmented and weakened, have found renewed strength, coordination and perhaps external backing to launch a campaign that threatens Assad’s hold on key territories.
If successful, the implications of this offensive are staggering. First, the fall of Assad’s regime would strike a devastating blow to Iran’s influence in the region. Tehran has invested heavily in Syria, seeing Assad as a linchpin in its so-called “axis of resistance” stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Losing this crucial ally would disrupt Iran’s supply lines, diminish its capacity to project power into the Levant and undermine its broader regional ambitions. In many ways, such a development would mirror the setbacks Iran has already faced at the hands of Israel. Just as Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah has constrained Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, the collapse of Assad would further blunt Tehran’s aspirations for dominance.
Russia, too, stands to lose significantly from a rebel victory. Moscow has spent years cultivating its image as a great power in the Middle East, using its intervention in Syria as a showcase for its military capabilities and as a platform to expand its influence in North Africa, particularly in Libya. But the surprise rebel offensive exposes the fragility of Russia’s achievements. Assad’s reliance on Russian airpower and advisors has tethered Moscow’s reputation to the regime’s survival. Should the rebels succeed in toppling Assad, Russia’s credibility as a reliable ally in the region would be severely undermined.
Moreover, a rebel victory could imperil Russia’s naval bases on the Syrian coast, particularly in Tartus and Latakia, which serve as Moscow’s warm-water ports in the Mediterranean. These bases are not merely logistical hubs; they symbolize Russia’s return to global power projection. Losing them would represent a strategic setback for Putin, weakening his ability to assert Russian influence in the Mediterranean and beyond. This loss could ripple outward, affecting Moscow’s efforts to secure footholds in other regions, such as Africa, where Russia has been increasingly active.
The implications of these developments for the U.S. are complex. On the one hand, the weakening of Iran and Russia aligns with long-standing American objectives of countering Iran’s destabilizing activities and limiting Moscow’s global ambitions. The prospect of a Syria no longer under Assad’s control, and by extension less accessible to Iran and Russia, would seem like a welcome strategic gain for America. But crucially, this shift could also open the door for Washington to adopt a more restrained approach to the region.
For years, American policymakers have grappled with how to manage the Middle East’s shifting alliances and conflicts while reducing direct military commitments. The rebel offensive in Syria underscores the extent to which local and regional actors are shaping outcomes independently of American intervention, suggesting an opportunity for the U.S. to step back from direct involvement, allowing regional dynamics to take the lead while maintaining a posture of offshore balancing.
The weakening of Iran and Russia without significant American intervention is precisely the kind of scenario that restraint proponents argue should guide U.S. strategy. By avoiding entanglement in Syria’s complexities, Washington can focus on leveraging these developments to indirectly secure its interests.
At the same time, the U.S. must remain vigilant about the potential for unintended consequences. The fragmentation of Syria’s opposition forces and the competing interests of external actors — including Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia — mean that the situation could evolve in unpredictable ways. A power vacuum in Syria, while limiting the influence of Iran and Russia, could also create conditions for renewed instability or the rise of extremist groups. However, rather than rushing to fill this vacuum, the U.S. could focus on diplomatic efforts and targeted support to prevent the worst outcomes while avoiding overreach.
Assad’s potential fall could affect broader geopolitical contests. For Russia, the loss of influence in Syria would reinforce perceptions of a declining global role, particularly as Moscow struggles to sustain its war in Ukraine. This could embolden NATO and other U.S.-aligned coalitions, reshaping the dynamics of competition between great powers.
Similarly, a diminished Iran might recalibrate the balance of power in the Gulf, providing an opening for improved relations between Israel and Sunni Arab states under the Abraham Accords framework. These shifts would require careful management, but they also suggest that the U.S. could achieve strategic gains with fewer direct commitments, a hallmark of a restraint-oriented grand strategy.
Ultimately, the surprise rebel offensive in Syria serves as a reminder that the Middle East remains a theater of both immense volatility and strategic significance. For Washington, this moment presents an opportunity to recalibrate its approach, embracing restraint and allowing regional actors to shoulder more responsibility.
The stakes are high, and the decisions made in the coming months will shape the trajectory of the region — and America’s role in it — for years to come. By avoiding unnecessary entanglement and focusing on prudent, indirect engagement, the U.S. can turn this moment of regional upheaval into an opportunity for a more sustainable and balanced strategy.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C.
